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There are several factors that make analyzing Android apps to address dependability and
security concerns challenging. These factors include (i) resource efficiency as analysts need to
be able to analyze large code-bases to look for issues that can exist in the application code
and underlying platform code; (ii) scalability as today’s cybercriminals deploy attacks that
may involve many participating apps; and (iii) in many cases, security analysts often rely on
dynamic or hybrid analysis techniques to detect and identify the sources of issues.
The underlying principle governing the design of existing program analysis engines is the
main cause that prevents them from satisfying these factors. Existing designs operate like
compilers, so they only analyze one app at a time using a "close-world" process that leads
to poor efficiency and scalability. Recently, Tsutana et al. introduced Jitana, a Virtual
Class-Loader (VCL) based approach to construct program analyses based on the "open-world"
concept. This approach is able to continuously load and analyze code. As such, this approach
establishes a new way to make analysis efforts proportional to the code size and provides
an infrastructure to construct complex, efficient, and scalable static, dynamic, and hybrid
analysis procedures to address emerging dependability and security needs.
In this thesis, we attempt to quantify the performance benefit of Jitana through the lens
of memory usage. Memory is a very important system-level resource that if not expended
efficiently, can result in long execution time and premature termination of a program. Existing
program analysis frameworks are notorious for consuming a large amount of memory during an
attempt to analyze a large software project. As such, we design an experiment to compare the

memory usage between Jitana and Soot, a widely used program analysis and optimization
framework for Java. Our evaluation consists of using 18 Android apps, with sizes ranging
from 0.02 MB to 80.4 MB. Our empirical evaluations reveal that Jitana requires up to 81%
less memory than Soot to analyze an app. At the same time, it can also analyze more
components including those belonging to the application and those belonging to the Android
framework.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Static program analysis has been successfully utilized to enhance software quality, dependability, and security over the last few decades. The main idea of static program analysis is
to analyze software (source code, intermediate representation code, or binary code) without
actually executing programs. The types of analysis that can be performed include identifying and computing software metrics, detecting software defects and security vulnerabilities,
applying formal methods, and verifying safety-critical software systems; e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
Because analysis is done directly on a code project without executing it, the first step to
perform program analysis is loading the project. Existing static program analysis techniques
take an approach similar to a compiler; that is, it first loads all code in the project to ensure
completeness. It then analyzes the loaded code. This type of analysis often makes a “closedworld” assumption; that is, the analysis is done on the complete code; and once the analysis
is done, the results cannot change. (We refer to this type of approach as “compiler-based”.)
Fundamentally, the goal is to analyze all relevant components in the project. However,
achieving this goal is quite challenging in modern computing systems because the analysis
requirements have changed to address emerging security and dependability issues better.
Below, we highlight some of these challenges.
Challenge 1. Modern programming languages and platforms provide rich library support.
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Therefore, loading just the application code alone may not be sufficient to ensure dependability
and security. Recently, we have seen various instances of security vulnerabilities and software
defects that affect a large number of computer systems worldwide [8,9,10]. In these examples,
the root causes exist in the underlying systems or supporting libraries. To detect these issues,
we need to analyze the application code and the supporting libraries together. However, such
analysis techniques have been shown to result in excessive memory consumption, making them
infeasible to scale up to meet this requirement.
Challenge 2. In addition to the high memory overhead, compiler-based analysis approaches
also have issues dealing with the dynamism of modern programming languages. As an
example, Android supports both Java Reflections and Dynamic Code Loading (collectively
referred to in this thesis as RDCL). These mechanisms allow new classes to be dynamically
loaded at runtime, possibly from external sources [11,12,13,14]. Recently, we have seen RDCL
used to deliver malicious payloads in highly elusive malware [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. When
a static analysis approach is used to analyze apps with RDCL, it cannot provide complete
coverage on its own because additional classes can be added to the existing code-base, making
the initial static analysis results incomplete and creating the need to perform analysis on the
entire code-base even for a small code change.
Challenge 3. Today’s apps can communicate with each other as well as provide services for
one another. For example, Android provides a mechanism called Inter-App Communication
(IAC) to allow apps to communicate and share services among themselves. Through mechanisms such as IAC, a new breed of malware in which multiple apps can collude has been
introduced [21, 22]. Thus, there is an emerging need to analyze these complex interactions
among apps in a device to identify such threats. Unfortunately, the current compiler-based
static analysis approaches address such issues by analyzing one app at a time and afterward,
combine the results [1, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Due to the need to perform analysis one app at a time,
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these techniques are too inefficient, making them unsuitable for at-speed per-device security
analysis.

1.1

Motivation

These challenges clearly illustrate the inherent limitations of existing compiler-based program
analysis approaches that make the closed-world assumption. To effectively address these
challenges, Tsutano et al. recently developed Jitana, a different type of static analysis
framework that constructs static program analysis information incrementally. Jitana’s major
underlying insight to is to break the traditional closed-world assumption, and instead, rely on
the “open-world” assumption achieved through the notion of “incrementality”. The underlying
idea is to incrementally load and analyze only the necessary code that is the transitive closure
of all the programs’ code and the underlying Android Development Framework (ADF ) code.
The idea is inspired by advancements in language runtime systems such as Java Virtual
Machine (JVM ) or Android Virtual Machine (AVM ) to support incremental execution via
class-loading and optimization of an application through dynamic compilation.
The first inspiration for Jitana is a class-loader, a runtime system used in both Java and
Android VMs to load only the necessary classes at runtime. A class-loader takes advantage
of application structures that partition code into classes to naturally and incrementally load
each class as it is needed for execution. It also supports various forms of late binding to
quickly resolve the ambiguity of finding which class to load through delegation. At the heart
of Jitana is the Class-Loader Virtual Machine (VCL) that fully adheres to the published
class-loader specification [27], but it operates as a stand-alone component in Jitana; i.e., it
does not operate as part of a language runtime system such as a JVM or AVM. The VCL
uses reachability analysis to uncover classes that must be loaded and delegates to resolve all
possible statically discoverable late binding targets.
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The second inspiration is the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler commonly used in modern
programming language runtime systems (e.g., those used to support Java, Python, and
JavaScript). A JIT compiler naturally performs program analysis in an incremental fashion;
i.e., it only analyzes a small portion of the code at a time (e.g., a method or a trace [28]) and
then performs optimization to generate the backend code. By utilizing VCL, we can already
load code incrementally. As such, it creates an opportunity to incrementally analyze each
class right after it is loaded. In this approach, the initial analysis would be intraprocedural.
Once the analysis on that class is completed, reachability analysis is used to uncover other
reachable classes and construct and propagate interprocedural information (e.g., method call
graph) among analyzed classes.

1.2

Contributions

In this thesis, we attempt to quantify the underlying difference in memory usage between
Jitana and Soot, a widely used program analysis and optimization framework for Java. As
previously stated, we hypothesize that the incremental nature of Jitana would allow it to
analyze more code than a traditional, compiler-based program analysis framework such as
Soot, given the same amount of memory.
To validate our hypothesis, we design an experiment to evaluate memory usage of each
approach. Our evaluation consists of using 18 apps. Each app is analyzed by both analysis
frameworks. The evaluation methodology includes developing tools to periodically measure
virtual memory usage during an analysis task performed by each framework. We also report
the number of methods analyzed by each approach. Note that the reported number of
methods by each analysis framework is different, because Jitana can analyze the complete
framework code while Soot does not.
In summary, the main contribution of this work is to compare the memory performance
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between the new incremental program analysis approach (represented by Jitana) and the
traditional compiler-based program analysis approach (represented by Soot). Our evaluation
result indicates that the incremental nature of Jitana can result in 81% memory conservation
than the traditional approach. As a result, the memory saving allows Jitana to analyze
more code, including critical components in the Android framework used by the application.

1.3

Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes exising program analysis
challenges, which motivate the development of Jitana. Chapter 3 describes the design of
Jitana and illustrate some of the differences in analysis results between Jitana and Soot.
Chapter 4 provides the detailed information related to our experiments. Chapter 5 reports
the experimental results. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2

Static Analysis Challenges and How They Are Addressed

As mentioned in Chapter 1, static program analysis frameworks are facing more demanding
analysis requirements to address emerging dependability and security issues. In this section,
we highlight three emerging challenges that today’s static program analysis frameworks
cannot address effectively and efficiently.
Challenge 1. The complex interactions between today’s application and the underlying
frameworks and libraries create the needs for static program analysis framework to be able to
analyze the application code in unison with the underlying framework code [9, 10, 29]. As an
example, solving dependability and security issues due to platform updates in a smart-mobile
device such as Android [30, 31] (e.g., determining why an app crashes after a platform
update) would require that the application code and the underlying Android Development
Framework (ADF) be analyzed together [4,8,26,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42]. However,
analyzing ADF code along with application code has been shown to result in excessive memory
consumption.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a typical memory requirement of a compiler-based approach when
used to analyze an Android application and ADF code. In our illustration, we focus on App
0 with its code size equals to A0 . It is currently running on ADF API-Level 25. This ADF
has a code size of B0 . To thoroughly analyze all relevant components used by App 0, the
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Figure 2.1: An Illustration of Different Static Analysis Challenges.
amount of code that a compiler-based static analysis approach needs to load is A0 + B0 due
to the closed-world assumption. Currently, the average Android app file size is about 12
MB; the file size of API-Level 25 is 160 MB. Thus, the total code that must be loaded is
approximately 172 MB (12 MB + 160 MB or 14 times the size than analyzing App 0 alone).
This is before performing any analysis. Typically, constructing program analysis information
such as control flow, data flow, and points to graphs would require a significant amount of
additional memory. For example, Soot a widely used program analysis framework for Java
and Android, recommends a minimum heap size of 10 GB [11]. Even with that large heap
size, when we use Soot to analyze large apps, we still see occasional “out of memory” errors.
There have been approaches that attempt to reduce memory consumption while considering
the underlying ADF code. They achieve this goal by using modeling, mining ADF code, or
automating learning of existing code [26, 41, 42] in place of performing analysis of application
and ADF code simultaneously. These approaches perform analysis in multiple steps. For
example, CiD first performs analysis of the application code to identify API calls into ADF.
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It then analyzes the ADF code to construct API Life Cycle Models and Conditional Call
Graph, which performs path-sensitive backward interprocedural data flow analysis toward
the code that performs version checks to reduce false positives [41]. A study by Scalabrino et
al. [42] reported that CiD cannot finish analyzing nearly 20% of apps (1,971/11,863) after
one hour.
ACRyL, on the other hand, only analyzes the application code and uses automated
learning to observe code changes with respect to API compatibility. This approach can
also suggest repairs. However, both approaches do not detect any compatibility issues that
occur through nested API calls within the ADF code. In addition, both approaches rely
on pre-analyzed data so that can produce incomplete results (e.g., in the case that some
necessary features are not part of the modeling efforts) and are not responsive to changes due
to frequent ADF updates or introduction of new issues (e.g., changes or new issues that were
not part of the learning datasets) [26, 42]. We conclude that excessive memory requirements
can cause program analysis techniques to be inefficient and even unreliable when there is not
enough memory. Furthermore, approaches to conserve memory can be ineffective in situations
where code is frequently updated.
Challenge 2. As previously mentioned, mechanisms such as RDCL allow new classes to be
dynamically loaded at runtime, possibly from external sources. RDCL is commonly used to
support several features in Android apps, including backward compatibility, dynamic updates,
component plugins, and serving advertisements. Recently, we have also seen RDCL used to
deliver malicious payloads in highly elusive malware [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Our preliminary
inspection of 60 games (e.g., NBA Live and Roblox), social network apps (e.g., Facebook
and Pinterest), and multimedia apps (e.g., Pandora and Spotify) from Google Play revealed
that 57% of these apps use RDCL to load classes dynamically. This prolific use of RDCL is a
significant increase from an earlier reported result, wherein only 16% of the top 50 apps from
2013 were found to use RDCL [12].
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When a static analysis approach is used to analyze apps with RDCL, it cannot provide
complete coverage on its own because additional classes can be added to the existing code-base
from external sources, making the initial static analysis results incomplete. Note that there
are existing static analysis approaches that can analyze apps with RDCL as long as those
dynamically loaded classes are accessible at the analysis time (e.g., these classes are hidden
in the code area of the project) [6, 7, 43, 44]. However, their analyses cannot discover classes
that are downloaded at runtime or hidden in inaccessible areas. To ensure completeness,
dynamically loaded classes must also be included as part of subsequent analysis attempts.
Work by Bodden et al. (TamiFlex) Zhauniarovich et al. (StaDyna) and Rasthofer et al.
(Harvester) perform hybrid analysis to address this challenge [11, 12, 13, 14]. First, their
approaches use dynamic analysis to identify and capture the dynamically loaded classes and
then add these classes to the project. Afterward, they statically reanalyze the project with
the addition of newly discovered classes.
Once again, we focus on App 0 in Figure 2.1. As shown, it uses RDCL to load two
additional classes (Class 0 and Class 1 ) of sizes C0 and C1 , respectively. Let us further
assume that these two classes are acquired from external sources, so they are not available
anywhere in the original code-base. If App 0 has already been statically analyzed, as soon as
Class 0 and Class 1 are loaded, App 0 must be analyzed again. In the case that there is
a very long delay between the loading of Class 0 and the loading of Class 1, an analysis is
likely done after the loading of each respective class. In the compiler-based approach, the
effort to reanalyze the project after Class 0 is loaded (i.e., A0 + B0 + C0 in this case) is not
proportional to that amount of code that changes (i.e., just C0 in this case). The inability to
scalably deal with dynamism to today’s programming languages make compiler-based static
analysis approaches ineffective and inefficient in addressing today’s dependability and security
concerns such as these.
Challenge 3. Today’s apps can communicate with each other as well as provide services for
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one another. For example, Android provides a mechanism called Inter-App Communication
(IAC) to allow apps to communicate and share services among themselves. Through mechanisms such as IAC, interactions among apps installed on a device can be quite complex, and
current compiler-based static analysis approaches are not capable of scalably analyze these
apps with timely results that can be used to address current security threats.
One of such emerging threats is colluding malware [21,22]. By leveraging IAC, sophisticated
collusive security threats exploit multiple apps to create longer calling paths to launch
malicious activities. Identifying this type of threat requires that all apps in the calling paths
be analyzed. Thus, the most effective and efficient way to detect colluding malware is to
perform an analysis per device because calling paths of colluding malware can only involve
apps installed on that device. Unfortunately, a recent study shows that, on average, there
are close to 100 apps installed on an Android device. There are currently over 3.3 million
Android apps on Google Play, and Google has made 17 releases of Android Platforms. The
sheer variability among apps and platforms make pre-analyzing all existing apps or even just
the most popular apps infeasible.
As we have shown in the first challenge, current static analysis approaches analyze one
app (optionally with ADF) at a time. Therefore, techniques that have been designed to
detect colluding malware, but built on top of compiler-based static analysis approaches, also
analyze one app at a time and then perform inter-component and inter-app analysis afterward
[45, 46, 47, 48]. As an illustration, we revisit Figure 2.1. We have App 0 to App N installed
on a device running ADF API-Level 25.
There are two general approaches to detect potential collusion. The first approach analyzes
a small set of programs for connections at a time. Li et al. introduce (IccTA), an approach
based on Soot. It consists of several tools [1, 23, 24] that perform per app analysis (i.e., it
needs to analyze App 0 to App N, one app at the time). It then performs cross-app analysis
on the results to find possible connections among apps. Once apps with connections are
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identified, they are combined into a non-executable but analyzable app using APKCombiner,
a tool capable of combining only very few apps for analysis [49]. We have experimented with
this approach and found it to be non-scalable.
The second approach aims to achieve better scalability by creating and then analyzing
architectural models. SEALANT [25] combines static analysis with runtime monitoring to
prevent IAC attacks. It statically analyzes (again using Soot) each app to identify channels.
It then extracts the architectural model of each app and performs compositional analysis
of these models to detect vulnerable channels [26]. By analyzing models, this approach is
more scalable than the first approach. By not fully analyzing the source code, the analysis is
more restrictive (i.e., it can only analyze issues that can be found through the models). In
addition, the compositional analysis iteratively builds analysis results from one app on top of
prior results. If more comprehension is needed (e.g., debugging or formulating repairs), per
app analysis is still needed to provide additional information. Due to the need to perform
analysis one app at a time, these techniques are too inefficient to be used for near-real-time
or at-speed security analysis.
In the next chapter, we describe Jitana, a program analysis framework introduced by
Tsutano et al. and highlight how it can address these three challenges.
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Chapter 3

Overview of Jitana

Tsutano et al. introduced Jitana, an incremental program analysis framework, to address
these three challenges [50]. The critical characteristic that enables Jitana to be able to
address these three challenges is the notion of "incrementality". By being able to load and
analyze code incrementally, Jitana requires less memory, allowing it to tackle large projects
while incurring reasonable memory usage. Jitana achieves incrementality by the use of a
Virtual Class-Loader (VCL).

3.1

Design of Jitana

As previously mentioned, existing runtime concepts that include class-loading and dynamic
compilation and optimization inspire the creation of VCL. Naturally, class-loading supports
incrementally loading of only the necessary classes. Each instance of ClassLoader, which is
a Java class inherited from an abstract class Ljava/lang/ClassLoader;, has a reference to
a parent class-loader.
The class-loader specification [27] supports Delegation Hierarchy Principle that is used to
discover and load classes through delegation [51]. When a class-loader cannot find a class, it
delegates the task to its parent class-loader. A class can be located and loaded by one of the
three class-loaders (i.e., Bootstrap, Extension, and Application). There are five supported
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methods: loadClass, defineClass, findClass, findLoadedClass, and Class.forName.
These methods can be used to define a class or find a class, load it, and initialize it. The
loaded classes are also unique.
VCL in Jitana strictly follows the Java classloading specification from Oracle [27]. It
supports all essential methods to support various class-loading and defining activities. It also
supports Delegate Hierarchy Principle, Visibility Principle, and Uniqueness Property. The
Delegate Hierarchy Principle contains several rules to define how to find and load classes and
ensure that the classloader does not load any duplicate classes. The principle also defines
how delegation among the three classloaders should work.
As an example, if VCL needs to load a new class, it first delegates the request to Application
Classloader, the request is further delegated to Extension Classloader, and finally, the last
delegation is made to Bootstrap Classloader. Delegation creates the searching and loading
hierarchy. Bootstrap Classloader first searches in the Bootstrap classpath to find the class. If
it cannot find it in the Bootstrap classpath, Extension Classloader searches in the Extension
classpath. If it cannot find it in the Extension classpath, Application Classloader searches in
the Application classpath to find and load the class. If it is still not found, VCL generates an
error.
During static analysis, VCL uses reachability analysis to identify classes that we need
to load. The main idea is to analyze the methods in each class to identify any additional
method calls within those methods to load classes to which these methods belong. For each
class discovered through reachability analysis, VCL applies the Delegate Hierarchy Principle
to locate and load that class. This capability provides Jitana with the ability to discover
and analyze loaded classes incrementally.
In addition, VCL also preserves the Visibility Principle, which states that a class loaded
by a parent class-loader (e.g., Extension Classloader ) is visible to the child class-loader; i.e.,
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the class is visible to Extension and Application Classloaders but not Bootstrap Classloader.
It also ensures that each loaded class is unique (Uniqueness Property).
In dealing with dynamic polymorphism, VCL exploits an insight that at runtime, both
a method or class name and the classloader information define a method or a class. Thus,
it records class-loader information as part of an analysis, so that it can have information
about the defining class-loader for a class. This information is similar to what being kept
inside the JVM or AVM to resolve dynamic method dispatch. However, the information is
not as precise, so all possible targets of a virtual interface are included for analysis. While
this can add additional classes and methods that must be analyzed, it is still much smaller
than loading the entire code-base. It is also a small tradeoff to ensure completeness.

3.2

Program Analysis with Jitana

1

SuperDepth

super_depth_classes.dex
parent_loader
0

2

System

core.dex
framework.dex
framework2.dex
ext.dex
conscrypt.dex
okhttp.dex
core-junit.dex
android.test.runner.dex
android.policy.dex

parent_loader

Facebook

data@app@com.facebook.katana-1.apk@classes.dex
program-eb5202dbb54c0efff1c01c5f...baa6.dex.dex
program-e2ca9fdbaa4e32f97b90b376...baa6.dex.dex
program-7feaf7c75a5305b1083a160f...baa6.dex.dex

parent_loader
parent_loader

3

Instagram

instagram_classes.dex
4

JohnNESLite

johnneslite_classes.dex

Figure 3.1: An illustration of a class-loader graph
Jitana presents the analysis results as hierarchical graphs that are Boost compliant [52].
These graphs consist of class-loader graph, class graph, method-call graph, and instruction
graphs. The class-loader graph contains information about apps under analysis. Figure 3.1
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illustrates a class-loader graph that includes four apps: SuperDepth, Facebook, Instagram,
and JohnNESLite.
3_0_t4001
0_0_t294

public

0_1_t2782

Ljava/lang/Object;

public abstract

Lcom/instagram/android/support/camera/LoadImageTask;

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

1_0_t87

public

Ljp/bio100/android/superdepth/GameBase$HttpTask;

Figure 3.2: A snippet of a class-graph related to AsyncTask

A class graph, shown in Figure 3.2, includes the relationship among classes. The figure
only shows a portion of the class graph that is related to AsyncTask. A method-call graph,
shown in Figure 3.3 includes method-call relationship.
0

static synthetic
Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

access$600(Landroid/os/AsyncTask;Ljava/lang/Object;)V
1
direct
0

private

0

protected final transient varargs

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

4 finish(Ljava/lang/Object;)V
8
1
virtual
virtual
0

0

protected

0

publishProgress([Ljava/lang/Object;)V
1
virtual
virtual

protected

0

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

onCancelled(Ljava/lang/Object;)V
1
virtual

onPostExecute(Ljava/lang/Object;)V

protected

1

isCancelled()Z

super

super

protected volatile bridge synthetic

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

Ljp/bio100/android/superdepth/GameBase$HttpTask;

onCancelled()V

onPostExecute(Ljava/lang/Object;)V
2
virtual

public final

Landroid/os/AsyncTask;

3
direct

protected volatile bridge synthetic

Lcom/instagram/android/support/camera/LoadImageTask;
onPostExecute(Ljava/lang/Object;)V
2
virtual
1

1

protected

3

protected

Ljp/bio100/android/superdepth/GameBase$HttpTask;

Lcom/instagram/android/support/camera/LoadImageTask;

onPostExecute(Ljp/bio100/android/superdepth/GameBase$TaskRes;)V

onPostExecute(Ljava/lang/Void;)V

Figure 3.3: An illustration of a method-call graph
For each method, there is an instruction graph (shown in Figure 3.4) containing Dex
instructions. It also contains intraprocedural data-flow (red arrows) and control-flow (blue
arrows) information.
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1_0_m244
Ljp/bio100/android/superdepth/GameBase;
sgn(I)I
0: ENTRY v1-v2
v2
26
1

0 (line=115)

v2

if-lez v2 []
true

20
4

4 (line=116)

if-gez v2 []
true

20
5

6
2

2

v0

const/4 v0 [1]

6

6

0

const/4 v0 [-1]

7

goto [-4]

7

8 (line=117)

v0

8

9

const/4 v0 [0]

goto [-6]

v0
3

3 (line=117)

return v0 []
vR

9: EXIT vR

Figure 3.4: An illustration of an instruction graph

3.3

Comparing Results Produced by Jitana and Soot

We create a simple HelloWorld program that contains three classes: HelloWorld, HelloWorldTwo,
and HelloWorldThree.

HelloWorld invokes helloClass2Method1, which is a method

in HelloWorldTwo. Method helloClass2Method1 simply calls println with is a native
method in java.io library. Note that the program does not invoke any method in class
HelloWorldThree. Figure 3.5 illustrates the method call graph produced by Soot, and
Figure 3.6 illustrates the method call graph produced by Jitana. Also note that we use the
same program for analysis but the one used by Soot was compiled into Java bytecode and
the one used by Jitana was compiled into Android Dex code.
As shown in Figure 3.5, Soot treats any calls to the underlying library (e.g., java/lang/Object
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<HelloWorld: void main(java.lang.String[])>

<HelloWorldTwo: void helloClass2Method1()>

<java.lang.System: void <clinit>()>

<java.lang.Object: void <clinit>()>

<java.io.PrintStream: void println(java.lang.String)>

Figure 3.5: A Method-call-graph of HelloWorld Produced by Soot
and java/io/PrintStream) as terminals. That is, the analysis ends at these calls. Jitana,
on the other hand, continue to load any of those system classes written in Dex. As such,
its method call graph also includes system-level methods such as finalize, hashCode, and
wait. The call appearing within the red circle in Figure 3.6, represents the actual call from
class HelloWorld to a method in class HelloWorldTwo.
The graph generated by Jitana also shows existing methods in a class even though they
have not been invoked. (Note that each red arrow indicates a method invocation.) For example,
methods such as notifyAll, notify, and finalize belong to class java/lang/objects but
they are not invoked. Similarly, methods helloWorldClass2Method2 and helloWorldClass3Method1
belong to hellowWorldClass2 and hellowWorldClass3, respectively. The are also not invoked. However, they are included because Jitana analyzes all the Dex methods in every
loaded class.
Also note that Jitana method call graph does not show java/io/println. Upon further
inspection, because java/io/PrintStream is a native library, VCL cannot load it, and
therefore, it is not analyzed. However, the call to println still appears in the instruction
graph as a method call.

18

1

public static

LHelloWorldTwo;
helloClass2Method2()V
1

public static

LHelloWorldThree;
helloClass3Method1()V
1

public static

1

LHelloWorld;

1

direct

main([Ljava/lang/String;)V
0

public static

LHelloWorldTwo;
helloClass2Method1()V

public final

Ljava/lang/Object;
wait()V

virtual

3

0

public final native
Ljava/lang/Object;

0

public final

virtual

wait(JI)V

virtual

getClass()Ljava/lang/Class;

Ljava/lang/Object; 2
wait(J)V
0

public final native
Ljava/lang/Object;
notifyAll()V

0

public final native
Ljava/lang/Object;
0

notify()V

public final native
Ljava/lang/Object;

0

public

3
Ljava/lang/Object;
virtual
toString()Ljava/lang/String; 12

0

public native

Ljava/lang/Object;
0

protected

hashCode()I

Ljava/lang/Object;
finalize()V
0

public

Ljava/lang/Object;
equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
0

protected

0

Ljava/lang/Object;

9

1

private native

direct

clone()Ljava/lang/Object;

Ljava/lang/Object;
internalClone(Ljava/lang/Cloneable;)Ljava/lang/Object;

public constructor
LHelloWorld;
<init>()V

1

1

direct

public constructor

LHelloWorldThree;

0
1

direct

<init>()V

public constructor
Ljava/lang/Object;
<init>()V

direct
1

public constructor
LHelloWorldTwo;

1

<init>()V

Figure 3.6: A Method-call-graph of HelloWorld Produced by Jitana

3.4

Addressing Existing Challenges

Concerning the previously mentioned first challenge, Jitana [50] addresses it by being able
to simultaneously analyze application code and ADF code efficiently and scalably within
a typical memory availability of a workstation or laptop. Unlike existing approaches to
reduce memory consumption, Jitana achieves this goal by loading just the necessary classes
from the app and ADF. This way, the effectiveness to detect, debug, and repair complex
dependability and security issues is not compromised.
To address the second challenge, Jitana can perform hybrid analysis to uncover RDCL
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classes and analyze them efficiently. Unlike existing approaches to repeatedly analyze the
entire code-base for each code change, Jitana achieves this goal by expending the analysis
effort that is proportional to the amount of code that changes. As shown in Figure 2.1,
Jitana only analyzes C0 and appends the new results to the previously computed results.
To address the third challenge, Jitana can analyze an extensive collection of apps or
apps installed on a device at speed. Unlike existing approaches that combine analysis results
from analyzing a single app at a time, Jitana achieves this goal by being memory-efficient
and better organization of analysis data to allow multiple apps to be analyzed simultaneously.
However, we can still distinguish each app within an analysis attempt.
In the next chapter, we investigate the memory usages of Soot and Jitana and report
the overall performances of both systems.
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Chapter 4

Experimental Evaluation

In this chapter, we report the results of our investigation to compare memory usage and
performance of Soot and Jitana. We also used APKTool [53] for decompilation of the
APK so that we can assess the number of lines of code. In our evaluation, we address the
following two research questions:
Research Question 1: Is Jitana more memory efficient than Soot and if yes, by how
much?
Research Question 2: Is Jitana more efficient, in terms of analysis time than Soot?

4.1

Objects of Analysis

We want to quantify the difference in memory usage between the compiler-based approach,
represented by Soot, and the classloader-based approach, represented by Jitana. By
intuition, the classloader-based approach incrementally loads code and therefore should be
much more memory-efficient and scalable. In this work, we attempt to verify the intuition
and quantify the savings. We used both approaches to analyze 18 Android apps and measured
the memory usage over time. We also recorded the analysis time.
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To ensure a fair and comprehensive evaluation, we selected 18 Android apps with sizes
ranging from less than 1 MB to over 50 MB as subjects for our experiment. We used
open-source repositories, such as F-Droid and APK Pure to obtain these apps [54, 55, 56].
The intention of having a wide range of app sizes is to observe how increasing size impact
memory performance for both analysis platforms.
Next, we establish baselines for the relative size of each Android app. Although the size
of APK is what an end-user would normally see when downloading an Android app, a large
portion of the APK is dedicated to related assets and resources, which do not contribute to
the logic of the app. To gain a more thorough understanding of the relative size of apps,
we first import and analyze the APK files in Android Studio, which gives us an overview
of the basic structure of each APK, such as the number and size of DEX files, number of
classes/methods defined, etc [57]. As a backup measure, we also decompiled each APK using
Apktool and counted the number of smali lines from each decompiled APK. In the end, we
used the total size of DEX files (DEX code is the Android VM binary) and the number of
lines of smali code (human-readable DEX disassembly) as the two main baseline indicators of
the complexity of performing static analysis. Table 4.1 describes the basic characteristics of
each app.

4.2

Variables and Measures

Independent Variables. Our independent variables involve the baseline technique used in
our study. We use FlowDroid as the baseline system. FlowDroid is a program analysis
framework based on Soot that has been modified to support analysis of Android apps. In
its original form, Soot performs analysis by assuming that the main method is the only
entry point into the program. However, Android applications can have multiple entry points.
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App Name
Snake
Battery Indicator
BitClock
AdBlockPlus
Guitar Flash
Calculator
iFixit
Slots Pharaohs Fire
TypoLab
Cute Animals
Dolphin EMU
BBC Weather
Bike Citizens Bicycle GPS
The Child of Slendrina
Moto Rider
Doodle Army
BBC News
Adobe Lightroom

APK Size
18 KB
2 MB
566 KB
2.6 MB
45.2 MB
4.3 MB
3.3 MB
45.1 MB
45.2 MB
45.2 MB
13.8 MB
9.2 MB
45.2 MB
45.1 MB
45.1 MB
45.1 MB
15.5 MB
80.4 MB

DEX Size
7.3 KB
180 KB
271 KB
404 KB
730 KB
674 KB
743 KB
994 KB
1.1 MB
1.3 MB
2 MB
2.4 MB
2.7 MB
2.2 MB
2.7 MB
3.8 MB
4.3 MB
6.2 MB

Number of Smali Lines
2,830
116,593
158,884
240,226
439,016
461776
471,658
673,772
841,209
1,114,023
1,258,159
1,659,200
1,827,500
1,839,378
2,120,364
2,820,695
3,257,594
4,485,608

Number of defined methods
44
2337
4743
5656
10608
10623
10323
17066
21735
25647
28648
40105
43604
43611
48812
6295
65677
101022

Table 4.1: Basic characteristics of experimental subjects.
FlowDroid, an Android taint analysis tool built on top of Soot, solves this issue by
creating a custom main method that considers all possible combinations of outgoing methods.
Since we are interested in comparing the static analysis performance of FlowDroid and
Jitana, we set up both tools to generate only the method call graph of a single app at a
time. On the other hand, FlowDroid performs taint analysis, which is an extra step on top
of generating the method call graph. We wrote a Java program to configure a Soot instance
with desired parameters, and then we instantiated FlowDroid to use the existing Soot
instance to generate the method call graph without performing further analyses.
To make sure the same set of Android Framework methods are available, both FlowDroid
and Jitana were configured to reference Android API level 25 framework files. We used the
latest version of both FlowDroid (2.7.1) and Jitana (2018.4).
Dependent Variables. To measure the memory usage of Jitana and FlowDroid, we use
existing performance monitoring tools available in macOS. We start the analysis and top,
the process monitor utility, at the same time, and we take a snapshot of top every second to
monitor the per-process memory usage reported in MB. We are particularly concerned with
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the peak memory usage, as it is the most common limiting factor to perform very complex
analyses.
Next, we calculate memory efficiency (M E) using the following formula:

ME =

Number of Methods in the Callgraph
the Peak Memory Consumption in MB

Note that a higher value of M E reflect how efficient an analysis framework uses memory.
To measure overall efficiency, we measure the record to perform each analysis and report the
result in seconds

4.3

Study Operation

We set up our evaluation environment on an Apple MacBook Pro with 2.7 GHz Quad-Core
Intel Core i7 and 16 GB LPDDR3 RAM running macOS Catalina (10.15.3). We repeat the
experiments three times and measure the amount of memory and time required to perform
the analysis of each app using the analysis techniques, each averaged over three attempts.

4.3.1

Threats to Validity

The primary threat to external validity in this study involves the object programs utilized.
In this work, our objects are based on programs that have been widely used by prior research
work [54, 55, 56]. We also ensure that they all can run on the same ADF (version 25 in this
case).
The primary threat to internal validity involves potential errors in the implementation of
our measurment process. To limit these, we extensively validated all of our measurement
components and scripts to ensure correctness.
The primary threat to construct validity relates to the fact that we study efficiency
measures relative to applications of Jitana, but do not yet assess whether the approach helps
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software engineers or analysts addresses dependability and security concerns more quickly
than current approaches. Next, we report the results of our evaluation.
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Chapter 5

Results

Next, we answer the two research questions. We formulate these answers based on our
empirical investigations to observe memory consumption and analysis time.

5.1

RQ1: Memory Savings

We report the overall performance in Table 5.1. We report the number of analyzed methods
in columns II and V for Soot and Jitana, respectively. Note that Jitana also analyzes
methods in the ADF code, and therefore, it processes more methods than those processed by
Soot. In columns III and VI, we report the amounts of memory (in MB) needed to support
the analysis of each app by Soot and Jitana. We report the analysis time of both systems
in columns IV and VII.
Soot completed analysis for all but one Android app, Adobe Lightroom, presumably
due to incompatibility from newer programming practices. FlowDroid terminated with a
runtime exception during the callgraph-construction phase. In all 18 apps, Jitana analyzed
significantly more methods than Soot. In the case of BitClock, the difference in the numbers
of analyzed methods is about 81 times. In the case of Battery Indicator, the difference is
about 3 times. On average, Jitana analyzes 11.84 times more methods than Soot.
While Jitana analyzes more methods than Soot in every application, it also requires less
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App Name
[I]
Snake
Battery Indicator
BitClock
AdBlockPlus
Guitar Flash
Calculator
iFixit
Slots Pharaohs Fire
TypoLab
Cute Animals
Dolphin EMU
BBC Weather
Bike Citizens Bicycle GPS
The Child of Slendrina
Moto Rider
Doodle Army
BBC News
Adobe Lightroom

Analyzed
Methods
[II]
84
1,195
57
632
2,244
2,850
3,423
3,148
4,242
1,221
2,867
6,307
6,948
3,047
4,880
10,336
9,461
n/a

Soot
Utilized
Memory
(MB)
[III]
130
330
175
293
481
737
797
787
834
455
786
1,390
1,455
838
1,369
1,742
1,727
1,408

Analysis
Time
(Seconds)
[IV]
1
4
1
3
6
8
10
12
13
5
12
23
26
20
28
61
67
n/a

Analyzed
Methods
[V]
727
3,548
4,631
7,048
10,856
12,898
12,365
18,421
22,782
23,834
28,290
37,503
40,444
39,748
44,279
48,903
49,139
47,304

Jitana
Utilized
Memory
(MB)
[VI]
21
64
57
112
135
180
161
218
252
273
390
374
431
436
460
520
570
503

Analysis
Time
(Seconds)
[VII]
1
3
2
3
5
5
5
6
8
9
12
12
16
14
14
16
16
21

Table 5.1: Comparing Memory Usage and analysis time between Soot and Jitana
memory than Soot to complete the analysis for each application. In the case of Snake, our
smaller app, Soot needs over 5 times more memory to analyze 7.6 times fewer methods. In
the case of Cute Animals, Soot needs 67% more memory to analyze 19 times fewer methods.
On average, Soot needs 2.07 times more memory to analyze an app.
Next, we report memory efficiency (M E) in Table 5.2. As a reminder, M E is the ratio
between the number of methods in a method call graph and peak memory usage.
As the table shows, M E of Jitana is significantly higher than that of Soot. In many
cases, the efficiency gain is as high as 249 times. On average, the M E of Soot is 3.87
methods per one MB, while the M E of Jitana is 79.98 methods per one MB. The average
efficiency gain of Jitana over Soot is 36.35 times.
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App
Snake
Battery Indicator
BitClock
AdBlockPlus
Guitar Flash
Calculator
iFixit
Slots Pharaohs Fire
TypoLab
Cute Animals
Dolphin EMU
BBC Weather
Bike Citizens Bicycle GPS
The Child of Slendrina
Moto Rider
Doodle Army
BBC News
Average

M ESoot

M EJitana

Gain
( MMEEJitana
)
Soot

0.65
3.62
0.33
2.16
4.67
3.87
4.29
4.00
5.09
2.68
3.65
4.54
4.78
3.64
3.56
5.93
5.48
3.70

34.62
55.44
81.25
62.93
80.42
71.66
76.80
84.5
90.40
87.30
72.54
100.28
93.84
91.17
96.26
94.04
86.21
79.98

53.57
15.31
249.44
29.17
17.24
18.53
17.88
21.13
17.77
32.53
19.89
22.10
19.65
25.07
27.00
15.85
15.74
36.35

Table 5.2: Comparing Memory Efficiency Between Soot and Jitana

5.2

RQ2: Efficiency

In term of analysis time, Table 5.1 shows that for the small size apps (i.e., Snake to Guitar
Flash), the analysis times of Soot and Jitana are comparable. However, as the apps become
large, Soot spends more time to analyze these apps. The two exceptions are Cute Animals
and Dolphin EMU. These are small apps; however, they invoke a huge number of methods
from the underlying framework. Small numbers of methods allow Soot to perform analysis
quickly. However, Jitana ends up analyzing more than 19 times and 9 times more methods
in these apps, respectively. Jitana takes longer than Soot to analyze Cute Animals, and it
takes about the same time as Soot to analyze Dolphin EMU. For very large apps such as
Doodle Army and BBC News, the analysis times of Soot are 2.81 to 3.18 times higher
than those of Jitana.
While the peak memory consumption can provide the highest memory watermark for
an analysis system, it does not provide the amount of memory the analysis system is using
concerning time. For example, a system that occupies a large amount of memory for a
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short time may perform better than another system that uses less memory but for a much
longer time. To observe memory usage over time, we recorded both Jitana’s and Soot’s
memory usage throughout execution. We plot time (in seconds) on the x-axis and the memory
consumption on the y-axis to form the memory-over-time graphs. Here we discuss the results
of three apps that are most representative of the entire range of apps tested.
By the sizes of their DEX files, BBC News (4.3 MB), Dolphin EMU (2.0 MB), and Cute
Animals Names and Sounds (1.3 MB) represent large, medium, and small Android apps.
Again, when mentioning the size of Android apps, we are referencing the relative logical
complexity, reflected by the size of DEX files or the number of lines of code. For example,
Cute Animals has the largest APK size but the smallest DEX size, meaning that most of
the files in its APK are not related to how the application works; instead, they are accessory
files, such as media, used to support the application’s functions.
We intend to analyze how Soot and Jitana perform in analyzing real-world apps of
varying complexities. For a small app, Soot and Jitana achieve the same time of completion;
however, the amount of memory needed by Jitana reaches plateau much quicker. It also
requires less peak memory. For a medium-sized app such as Dolphin EMU, Jitana manages
to use around 300 MB of memory during most of the analysis, while Soot’s memory usage
continued to increase to almost 800 MB.
The performance difference in memory usage becomes even more staggering when both
systems analyze large apps. BBC News, whose APK has multiple DEX files, represents a
reasonably complex Android app that an end-user would encounter in real life. As Figure 5.3
shows, Jitana outperforms Soot by a big margin, both in terms of speed and memory
usage.
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Figure 5.1: Memory Usage Over Time for Analyzing a Simple App.

Figure 5.2: Memory Usage Over Time for Analyzing a Medium-Sized App.
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Figure 5.3: Memory Usage Over Time for Analyzing a Complex App.
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Chapter 6

Conclusions

In this study, we analyzed the advantages of the class-loading approach in static analysis
over the traditional compiler-based approach. We also designed experiments to measure the
memory efficiency and performance of Soot and Jitana for constructing method call graphs
across a wide range of Android apps. Our results show that Jitana conserves up to 5.2 times
memory and achieves an average efficiency gain of 36.35 times over Soot.
As the average size of smartphone apps grows, tools based on the class-loading approach
like Jitana will scale more easily than compiler-based approaches like Soot. Jitana also
made it feasible to analyze methods from both the application itself and the underlying
Android framework, thereby achieving a more complete analysis. In general, the compilerbased approach is even more inefficient for analyzing the Android framework code, since
it would have to load the entire codebase, only to analyze a relatively small number of
reachable classes within the framework. Though it is theoretically possible to analyze both
the application and the framework code with Soot, the memory overhead would make
it infeasible on most personal computers. Therefore, we conclude that the class-loading
approach, represented by Jitana, is more memory-efficient and scalable for performing static
analysis of today’s complex applications.
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